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The Diagelo Quarterly · Q1 2026

The Year Africa Set the Terms

What 2025 and the first quarter of 2026 revealed about a continent that stopped waiting to be told the terms.

14 minutes Foresight · Intelligence · Ecosystem Published March 2026
The Continent, 2025 into 2026
Six layers of one turbulent year. Toggle any layer to read it differently.
Cover
Kenya to Ghana, first GTIRwanda coffee to GhanaCentral CorridorAbidjan to LagosCOMESA spineSACU $15.7bn of eurobonds, 2025 Lesotho 50%Madagascar 47%Botswana 37%South Africa 30% Ghana · Dec 2024Namibia · Dec 2024Mauritius · Nov 2024Gabon · Apr 2025Cote d Ivoire · Oct 2025Malawi · Sep 2025Tanzania · Oct 2025G20 Summit · Nov 2025 JohannesburgCape TownNairobiLagosCairoCasablancaAbuja
one year, read six ways. Diagelo Intelligence, drawing on World Bank Global Economic Prospects, January 2026, CSIS on the tariffs, AfCFTA reviews, the G20 Johannesburg declaration and national electoral records, March 2026.
Editor's Letter

Who Sets the Terms

For a generation, the terms that governed African economies were drafted abroad and administered here. In 2025 that arrangement loosened, in two directions at once.

The last time this map was redrawn in a single room, in Berlin in 1884, no African was present, and the borders those men drew still run under today’s quarrels. Setting Africa’s terms from elsewhere was never a policy so much as a reflex; this is the record of a year it met resistance.

Start with the letter that reached Maseru. In April 2025 the American president set tariffs read straight off trade balances, so the smallest economies drew the highest numbers. Lesotho, a kingdom of two million, was assigned 50 percent, the steepest rate levied on any country, penalised for selling more denim than it could buy back. Meant to be strategy, it read like a clerical accident with a flag on it.

Now a second scene. In November, heads of state landed in Johannesburg for the first G20 summit ever held on African soil, under a South African presidency that put debt, inequality and the cost of capital at its centre. The two most powerful invitees stayed away; the declaration passed anyway. For once the continent held the chair; what that is worth, this issue takes seriously.

Between them runs this issue’s argument. The old arrangement had one author: the price of money, trade preferences and digital rules, all set in foreign capitals and handed down as fixed. An earlier brief argued that a market belongs to whoever writes its rules, not to whoever trades inside them. In 2025 that stopped being abstract.

The counter-current shows first in the growth data. The IMF’s January 2026 update put sub-Saharan Africa near 4.4 percent for 2025; the World Bank had the region nearer 4.0. Beneath that regional figure, Benin and Rwanda ran above 7 percent while much of the oil bloc barely moved. There is no single African economy. There are fifty, keeping different time.

It shows up in money and silicon. After a two-year freeze, African sovereigns returned to debt markets: by year-end eight countries had raised 15.7 billion dollars across fourteen eurobond issues, with spreads at their tightest since 2019. Yet the market re-priced Africa upward, not down. Meanwhile AI’s physical layer began landing here, not being rented from here: Google opened a Johannesburg cloud region, Microsoft and G42 committed a billion dollars, and Cassava signed with Nvidia for the continent’s first AI factory. Whether that is ownership or subtler tenancy, I return to below. That the machines now sit on African ground is not.

If I had to keep one of those scenes, I would keep the quieter one. Tariffs are weather: they arrive, do real damage, and pass; the 15 percent Lesotho was left with will be argued over again before the decade is out. A continent learning to price its own debt and host its own compute is climate. Weather takes the headlines. Climate decides where you can build.

Together they describe the year: Africa took the era’s harshest imposed terms and, in the same span, wrote more of its own than it had in years. The point is not to reconcile them but to ask a sharper question, of the reader as much as the continent. Not whether the terms are fair; they are not, and were never meant to be. The narrower one: on the decisions shaping the coming decade, whose terms is your institution accepting by default, and which could it be setting instead?

Founder, Diagelo · Johannesburg · March 2026
A seal is what makes a term binding.
The question of the year was whose it carried.
The Year in Brief

One year, two letters

Two envelopes, the same year. The first came from a podium in Washington: fifty percent on Lesotho, two million people, the steepest tariff put on anyone anywhere. Nobody in Maseru was asked. The second got written closer to home. Johannesburg took the G20 chair, Cassava broke ground on the continent's first AI factory, and eight governments walked back into the bond market at spreads we had not seen since before the pandemic.

For a generation the terms only ever came one way, drafted somewhere else and posted in. This was the year the post started running both directions at once. One envelope does not cancel the other. Read them apart and you will misread the year.

both, same post.
The year, weighed imposed tariffs · aid cuts · price of money authored G20 · AfCFTA · AI factories
Five Signals That Matter

The year, read against the grain

Five readings of 2025 and the quarter just closed. We left out the ones that only make you sound informed and kept the ones that change what you do on Monday.

the Monday five.
01

When a Mountain Kingdom Got the World's Highest Tariff

On 2 April 2025, from a podium he named Liberation Day, the American president declared a national emergency over the trade deficit and imposed reciprocal tariffs on much of the world. The rates were calculated from bilateral trade balances, so the smallest economies with the least to buy from America were hit hardest.

Lesotho, a landlocked kingdom of two million people, drew 50 percent, the highest rate assigned to any country. Madagascar took 47, Botswana 37, South Africa 30. Twenty African countries were placed above the 10 percent baseline. For textile towns whose entire business rested on duty-free access to American shelves, the terms of that access changed in a single afternoon.

By August the picture had shifted again. Lesotho's rate was cut to 15 percent, where most African exporters settled, while South Africa and the North African states stayed higher. An earlier Diagelo brief tracked how the tariff became the trade instrument of the year, the point at which comparative advantage stopped setting the terms of trade and access itself became something to be renegotiated.

ImplicationMarket access is now a political variable, not a given.
The smallest buyers drew the steepest rates.
50Lesotho47M'gascar37Botswana15Aug ratetariff, percent
Liberation Day rates on Africa's textile exporters, and the level most settled at by August. Source: Al Jazeera, CSIS, AllAfrica, 2025.
02

The Money Came Back, and on Better Terms

For two years African sovereigns were shut out of international debt markets by borrowing costs that ran among the highest in the world. In 2025 that ended. Côte d'Ivoire opened in January, Benin and Kenya followed within weeks, and the window stayed open through the year.

By December, eight countries had raised 15.7 billion dollars across fourteen eurobond issues, up 15 percent on 2024, with Morocco's two billion dollar deal heavily oversubscribed. Yields on Kenya's 2028 note fell from 10.4 to 8.3 percent over the year. The S&P Africa Sovereign Bond Index returned more than 20 percent to October, and spreads narrowed to their tightest since 2019.

The relief is genuine; so is the caveat. Most of the proceeds refinanced maturing debt rather than funding new capacity, and the coupons still cleared 8 percent, a rate that outruns the nominal growth of several of the issuers, which is how a refinancing window quietly becomes a maturity problem. What changed in 2025 is only the direction of the terms, not their generosity: for the first time since the pandemic the market moved toward these borrowers rather than away from them, and it did so selectively, rewarding the sovereigns that had done the fiscal work.

ImplicationThe credit window is open, but it rewards the disciplined, not everyone.
After two years shut out, the money came back.
$13.7bn$15.7bn20242025eurobond issuance
African sovereign eurobond issuance. Source: AttijariCIB, Ecofin Agency, 2025.
03

There Is No African Economy. There Are Fifty.

The estimates available at the start of 2026 all told the same broad story. The IMF's January 2026 update put sub-Saharan Africa near 4.4 percent for 2025; the World Bank's January Global Economic Prospects put the region nearer 4.0 percent, up from 2024 and comfortably above a world running around 3.2 percent.

The regional figure is the least useful number in either report. The same World Bank tables show Benin above 7 percent and Burundi and the East African tier firming, while Angola sat near 2 percent and Equatorial Guinea and parts of the oil bloc contracted. The gap between the fastest and slowest large economies is now several times over, which is why the correct question is never how Africa is doing but which Africa, exposed to which shock. Two further things pull in the same direction. Per capita income across the region grew under 2 percent, short of the pace that reduces poverty quickly. And the official series miss where most people actually earn: close to nine in ten sub-Saharan workers operate in an informal economy the national accounts were never built to see, so the dispersion on the chart understates the real one.

The continental frame hides more than it reveals, and it does so at every level, country, region, sector. Anyone still allocating against a single African growth number in 2026 is pricing an average that corresponds to almost no real place.

ImplicationOne continent, more than fifty clocks. No allocation should run on the average.
The regional number nobody actually grows at.
036912Rwanda7.2Ethiopia6.5Uganda4.5Region avg4.0oil econ.2.0real GDP growth 2025, percent
Real GDP growth, 2025 estimates, selected economies against the regional average. Source: IMF WEO January 2026 update; World Bank Global Economic Prospects, January 2026.
04

The Machines Arrived With African Addresses

For a decade the compute behind African software ran on other continents. In 2025 that began to change in physical, visible ways. Google opened a cloud region in Johannesburg with a 148 million dollar commitment, and Microsoft with G42 put a billion dollars into a Kenyan cloud region and Swahili-language models.

The more consequential move came from an African operator. Cassava Technologies, built by Strive Masiyiwa, signed with Nvidia to build the continent's first AI factory, a 700 million dollar rollout starting with 3,000 GPUs in South Africa and reaching 12,000 across Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and Morocco. Unlike the state-led projects in the Gulf, this one is privately executed with an African firm holding the design.

The question the deal does not yet answer is ownership, and it is answerable with a checklist rather than a slogan. Who holds title to the GPUs once the financing is repaid; who sets the price per compute-hour; where the model weights and the customer relationships sit; and who books the recurring revenue. Africa still accounts for roughly 1 percent of global AI data-centre capacity, and only five of South Africa's 56 data centres are AI-capable, so the base is small enough that these four answers will decide whether the continent is building an industry or hosting someone else's. I will track them by name in later issues.

ImplicationHosting compute is not the same as owning it.
Three thousand chips now, twelve thousand promised.
3,00012,0002025, ZAplanned, 5 ctryNvidia GPUs deployed
Cassava and Nvidia GPU rollout, first phase and plan. Source: Intelligent CIO Africa, 2025.
05

A Seat at the Head of the Table

In November 2025, Johannesburg hosted the first G20 summit ever held on African soil, under a South African presidency themed on solidarity, equality and sustainability. It was the first summit since the African Union took a permanent seat at the table.

South Africa used the chair to push debt relief, the cost of capital and inequality onto the core agenda, including a proposal for an intergovernmental panel on inequality modelled on the climate panel. The two most powerful leaders invited stayed away, and the summit adopted a leaders' declaration anyway.

It is worth being exact about what that is worth. The declaration carries no disbursement mechanism and binds no creditor, and by mid-March it had not moved a single financing term for a single sovereign. The honest reading is: not yet. What would count as evidence that the chair mattered is specific and checkable, a multilateral facility priced off the Johannesburg language, a restructuring that cites it, a line item in a 2026 budget somewhere that would not otherwise exist. Absent that, convening power is exactly that, and no more. Set against the tariff letter that opened the year, though, the fact that the agenda was drafted here at all is not nothing.

ImplicationConvening power is real, and it is not yet decision power.
One year, pulling two ways at once.
terms imposedtariffs, aid cuts, price of moneyterms authoredG20, AfCFTA, AI factoriesthe same twelve months
Diagelo Foresight schematic. The two directions of 2025.

Key Takeaways

  • The organising fact of 2025 is that the terms loosened in both directions. Africa absorbed the harshest trade shock imposed on anyone and, in the same year, drafted more of its own agenda than it had in years.
  • The Liberation Day tariffs turned market access into a live political variable. A 50 percent rate on Lesotho, later cut to 15, showed how fast the terms of trade can be written and rewritten.
  • Capital returned. Eight sovereigns raised 15.7 billion dollars in eurobonds and spreads hit a post-2019 low, but the coupons still cleared 8 percent and the money mostly rolled old debt rather than funding new capacity.
  • The regional growth average is close to useless as a planning input. On the January IMF and World Bank estimates, Rwanda ran above 7 percent while parts of the oil bloc contracted, and per capita gains stayed under 2 percent, short of what poverty reduction needs.
  • The physical layer of AI began to be sited on the continent, with Google's Johannesburg region and Cassava's 700 million dollar Nvidia factory. Africa still holds about 1 percent of global AI capacity, and ownership, not hosting, is the open question.
  • The Johannesburg G20, the first on African soil, gave the continent the chair. Convening power is real; it is not yet decision power, and the declaration has moved no financing term so far.
The correct question is never how Africa is doing, but which Africa, exposed to which shock.
Signal Three · Diagelo Foresight
Graphic of the Quarter

Anatomy of a Tariff Shock

How one line in an executive order travelled from a Washington podium to a factory floor in Maseru, and why the firms that came through it were the ones that already had a second buyer. Read left to right.

the middle is where it hurt.
Diagelo Intelligence

From decree to exit, in five moves

The band narrows as options close, then widens where a second market was waiting.

THE DECREETHE FACTORYTHE SHIPMENTTHE RETREATTHE EXITSTAGE 01The decree2 Apr 2025a Liberation Day orderimposes reciprocal tariffs;Lesotho drawn at 50%,the world's highestWHAT BINDSA single executive order,calculated from bilateraltrade balancesSTAGE 02The factory30,000 jobsexposed in Lesotho'stextile sector alone, builtentirely around duty freeaccess to US shelvesWHAT BINDSFirms with one buyerand one product line,no second doorSTAGE 03The shipment$237mof Lesotho exports to theUS in 2024, over 10% ofits GDP, now facing arewritten cost baseWHAT BINDSPorts, orders andcontracts priced on theold tariff scheduleSTAGE 04The retreat50% to 15%by August the rate is cutfor most of Africa; a 90day pause, then a settledband near 15%WHAT BINDSRelief that arrives afterorders are alreadycancelled or movedSTAGE 05The exitother doorsSouth African car exportsto the US fall 75%, yettotal exports hit a record414,268 unitsWHAT BINDSBuyers cultivated beforethe shock; optionalitybuilt in advance
01

The damage concentrates in the middle of the chain, not at the podium. The decree cost nothing to write; it cost most to absorb for firms whose capital was committed to a single buyer with no second door.

02

The band widens again only where a second market already existed. A firm cannot buy optionality after the order lands; it has to have paid for it in advance. That is the operative lesson of the shock, and it holds well beyond textiles.

Each stage is a decision taken by someone else, until the last, which is taken here. Diagelo Intelligence. Data: Al Jazeera, AllAfrica, ISS, and our own Tariff War brief, 2025 to 2026.
Three Charts Worth Studying

Three charts that reset the base case

Chart One

Five economies, one misleading average

The January estimates put continental growth near 4 percent for 2025, on the World Bank's regional reading, with the IMF slightly higher for sub-Saharan Africa. The figure is real and close to useless as a planning input. Rwanda ran above 7 percent and the East African tier firmed, while oil exporters barely moved and Equatorial Guinea and parts of the bloc contracted. The average sits in empty space between them.

Why it matters. An allocator working from the regional number is pricing a country that does not exist. The spread between the fastest and slowest large economies is now several times over, so the useful question is never how Africa is doing but which Africa, exposed to which shock. The single figure understates the leaders and overstates the laggards at the same time, which is precisely the wrong error to build a position on.

Which Africa are you actually pricing?
03%6%9%12%Real GDP growth, 2025, percent7.2Rwanda6.5Ethiopia4.5Uganda4.0Region2.0Oil econ.regional average, ~4%The single figure sits between economies growing several times faster than each other.Source: IMF WEO January 2026 update and World Bank Global Economic Prospects, January 2026.
Chart Two

The window that reopened

After two years locked out by punishing yields, African sovereigns returned to international debt markets in 2025. Issuance rose to 15.7 billion dollars across fourteen deals by eight countries, up 15 percent on the year before, and spreads narrowed to 388 basis points, the tightest since 2019.

Why it matters. Access to the eurobond market is a verdict on credibility, and in 2025 the verdict improved. But most of the money rolled maturing debt forward rather than funding new capacity, and the coupons still cleared 8 percent, above the nominal growth of several issuers, which is the arithmetic that turns a refinancing into a slow-building maturity problem. The window is open and it is not cheap. Sovereigns that use it to buy time without buying reform will meet it again, on worse terms, at the wall.

When did the bond market let Africa back in?
051015Sovereign eurobond issuance, US$ billion$13.7bn$15.7bn20242025, up 15%388 bpseurobond spread,tightest since 2019Fourteen issues by eight countries. Kenya's 2028 yield fell from 10.4 to 8.3 percent in a year.Source: AttijariCIB and Ecofin Agency, 2025.
Chart Three

Four rates in five months

Lesotho began 2025 with duty-free access to the United States under AGOA. On 2 April it was assigned 50 percent, the highest tariff in the world. Within days a 90-day pause dropped most rates to a 10 percent baseline. By August the kingdom settled at 15 percent, where most of Africa landed.

Why it matters. The final number matters less than the path to it. A factory owner cannot plan against a tariff that moves four times in five months, and the orders cancelled during the 50 percent window did not come back when the rate fell. The volatility did the damage, not the level. What the year exported was not a rate but the knowledge that the rate can be changed at will, and that is the harder thing to price into a supply contract.

How long did fifty percent actually last?
015%30%45%Lesotho tariff into the United States, percent0%pre-202550%2 Apr10%Apr pause15%AugFive months, four different rates. The predictability never came back, even when the level did.Source: Al Jazeera and AllAfrica, 2025. Rates as assigned at each stage.
The volatility did the damage, not the level. What the year exported was the knowledge that the rate can be changed at will.
Chart Three · Diagelo Foresight
Books, Reports and Papers

Four documents that earned their weekend

Four outside reports. For each, a line on what it should change in how you hold the year, because a reading list without that is just homework.

World Bank · Washington · January 2026
The take

The most current scorecard an allocator could hold at the start of the year: regional growth near 4 percent, and a spread wide enough to retire the single African number as a planning tool. Read the country tables, not the headline. The distance between the East African tier and the oil exporters is the whole story, and the IMF's January update tells the same one from a slightly higher base.

Center for Strategic and International Studies · October 2025
The take

The clearest account of how the tariff shock and the lapse of AGOA collided with an administration that also wanted trade in place of aid. For any exporter the takeaway is blunt: American market access is now a domestic political variable, and should be priced as one.

G20 South African Presidency · November 2025
The take

A 122-paragraph document is rarely worth reading in full; this one is worth reading for what it represents. The first leaders' declaration produced on African soil, with debt and the cost of capital near the centre. Convening power committed to paper. Whether it converts to disbursement is the test of 2026.

Africa Labour Research and Education Institute · 2025
The take

The most honest audit of the continental free trade area at five years: 35 countries piloting real trade, 2.3 million jobs linked to it, and a candid ledger of what has not moved. The gap between a signed protocol and a working customs post is where the next decade of intra-African trade will actually be decided.

Revisiting Our Thinking

Marking Our Own Homework

Few institutions publicly audit their own published work. We intend to do it every quarter, on the record, including the parts that did not hold.

Diagelo Intelligence · published September 2025

The Tariff War Nobody Could Ignore

Revisited March 2026, against six months of outcomes.
What held

We argued that Liberation Day marked the end of comparative advantage as the operating rule of trade, and that access to the American market had become a favour to be renegotiated rather than a right. Nothing in the first quarter softened that. AGOA lapsed on 30 September 2025, was restored on 3 February 2026 on a one-year horizon, and every African exporter now budgets for a market that can close by executive order.

Where we were right

We wrote that the damage would come through volatility more than the headline rate, and that orders lost during the shock would not return when the number fell. Lesotho's rate moved from 50 to 10 to 15 percent inside five months, and the factories that lost contracts in the 50 percent window did not recover them at 15. Retroactive relief does not rehire a shift.

Where we were wrong, and by how much

The September brief stated plainly: "the loss of the US market will pull total South African vehicle exports down by 8 to 12 percent in 2025." It did not. Exports to the United States did collapse, from 25,554 units in 2024 to 6,530 in 2025, roughly a 75 percent fall. But total vehicle exports rose 5.9 percent to a record 414,268 units (NAAMSA, February 2026), because Europe absorbed the difference under the existing EU and UK agreements. The forecast missed by 14 to 18 points, and the whole of the miss came from underweighting order books that were already diversified before the tariff arrived. We priced the shock and ignored the shock absorber.

50%
Lesotho's Liberation Day tariff, the highest assigned to any country.
15%
The rate most of Africa settled at by August 2025.
20
African countries hit above the 10 percent baseline.
1 yr
Length of the AGOA renewal that followed the lapse.

Key Takeaways

  • The thesis held on direction and mechanism: comparative advantage gave way to raw bargaining power, and volatility did more damage than the level.
  • The thesis missed adaptation. We forecast total vehicle exports would fall 8 to 12 percent; they rose 5.9 percent to a record. The miss was 14 to 18 points, all of it from underweighting pre-existing non-US order books.
  • The correction we carry forward: model the second door. Any forecast of a shock that ignores existing optionality will overstate the damage.
Questions We Are Watching

Five Questions We Are Holding

We publish the questions we cannot close. A question held honestly is worth more than a forecast held loosely.

01
Does an AI factory make an owner, or just a better tenant?
Watching: whether Cassava's GPUs anchor African-owned models and revenue, or simply host workloads priced and captured elsewhere.
02
Can South Africa convert the G20 chair into anything durable?
Watching: whether the Johannesburg declaration's debt and cost-of-capital commitments survive contact with a presidency that handed the gavel onward in December.
03
Is AGOA worth saving, or already a relic?
Watching: whether the one-year renewal is extended, and whether African exporters keep diversifying away from a US market that now resets its own terms annually.
04
Will the open eurobond window fund building, or just refinancing?
Watching: how much of 2026 issuance funds new capacity versus rolling old debt, and whether the maturity wall arrives before the reforms do.
05
Does AfCFTA move from pilot to plumbing?
Watching: whether the 35 Guided Trade countries turn published tariff books into working customs posts, and whether intra-African trade share finally moves off its floor.
Retroactive relief does not rehire a shift.
Revisiting Our Thinking · on the AGOA lapse
Looking Ahead

On the Diagelo Desk

Intelligence

The World's Largest Board Meeting

Our reading of the 2024 to 2025 election supercycle, when 1.6 billion people voted, Africa cast few of those ballots, and now lives with nearly all of their consequences.

Now live · Intelligence brief
Systems

Builders Versus Owners

Why the continent keeps producing world-class builders while other economies capture the ownership, and where the value actually compounds.

Now live · Systems brief
The Year, in One Picture

Weather, and climate

One line is the tariff: it spiked in April, did real damage, and drifted back toward the baseline. The other is the continent pricing its own debt and hosting its own compute, climbing quietly all year. Run the pointer across 2025 to read them together.

JanAprJulOctDecFeb two lines this year.only one of them stays. eurobonds reopenAI factories landG20 chairLesotho +50%left at 15% Weather · terms imposed on AfricaClimate · terms Africa authored Apr '25 weather leaves. climate stays.
The imposed terms of the year were louder; the authored ones will still be here when the noise has passed. Diagelo Intelligence
From the desk

One last thing, before you close this.

I have read this chart more times than I should admit, and it is never the gold spike that stays with me. It is the quiet green line underneath: a continent, inside a single year, learning to price its own debt and keep its own machines. The loud terms will keep arriving from rooms no one here was invited to. The quiet ones are the ones with local names on the deed. If you carry a single habit into the year, let it be this: watch the line that climbs while no one is shouting.

The EditorJohannesburg

Terms are not weather.

For a long time they were treated as if they were: handed down from elsewhere, to be survived rather than shaped. In 2025 that assumption stopped holding cleanly. A tariff did arrive from a podium no African voter could reach. But a G20 was chaired here, a free trade area kept building, and the first AI factories broke ground with local names on the deed.

The lesson is not that Africa now sets its own terms; on most of what matters, it plainly does not. The lesson is narrower. More of those terms are contested than a year ago, more are being drafted on the continent than before, and the institutions that treat every rule as fixed will keep being surprised by the ones that move. Which of the four decade-trajectories mapped last January Africa ends up on will be settled less by any single forecast than by who keeps drafting the terms, year after year, in rooms like the one in Johannesburg.

The task is not to predict which terms will change. It is to know, at every moment, which ones your institution is accepting by default, and which ones it could be writing itself.

Write to us

The Diagelo Quarterly is published as a public good. Disagreement, correction and better data are all welcome, and the revisiting section exists to carry them.

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