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The Diagelo Quarterly · Q1 2026

The Year Africa Set the Terms

What 2025 and the first quarter of 2026 revealed about a continent that stopped waiting to be told the terms.

14 minutes Foresight · Intelligence · Ecosystem Published March 2026
The Continent, 2025 into 2026
Six layers of one turbulent year. Toggle any layer to read it differently.
Cover
Kenya to Ghana, first GTIRwanda coffee to GhanaCentral CorridorAbidjan to LagosCOMESA spineSACU $15.7bn of eurobonds, 2025 Lesotho 50%Madagascar 47%Botswana 37%South Africa 30% Ghana · Dec 2024Namibia · Dec 2024Mauritius · Nov 2024Gabon · Apr 2025Cote d Ivoire · Oct 2025Malawi · Sep 2025Tanzania · Oct 2025G20 Summit · Nov 2025 JohannesburgCape TownNairobiLagosCairoCasablancaAbuja
one year, read six ways. Diagelo Intelligence, drawing on World Bank Global Economic Prospects, January 2026, CSIS on the tariffs, AfCFTA reviews, the G20 Johannesburg declaration and national electoral records, March 2026.
Editor's Letter

Who Sets the Terms?

For a generation, the terms that governed African economies were drafted abroad and administered here. In 2025 that arrangement loosened, in two directions at once.

The last time this map was redrawn in one room, in Berlin in 1884, no African was present, and the borders those men drew still run under today’s quarrels. Setting Africa’s terms from elsewhere was never a policy so much as a reflex; this is the record of a year it met resistance.

Start with the letter that reached Maseru. In April 2025 the American president set tariffs read straight off trade balances, so the smallest economies drew the highest numbers. Lesotho, a kingdom of two million, was assigned 50 percent, the steepest rate levied on any country, penalised for selling more denim than it could buy back. Meant to be strategy, it read like a clerical accident with a flag on it.

Now a second scene. In November, heads of state landed in Johannesburg for the first G20 summit ever held on African soil, under a South African presidency that put debt, inequality and the cost of capital at its centre. The two most powerful invitees stayed away; the declaration passed anyway. For once the continent held the chair; what that is worth, this issue takes seriously.

Between them runs this issue’s argument. The old arrangement had one author: the price of money, trade preferences and digital rules, all set in foreign capitals and handed down as fixed. An earlier brief argued that a market belongs to whoever writes its rules, not whoever trades inside them. In 2025 that stopped being abstract.

The counter-current shows first in the growth data. The IMF’s January 2026 update put sub-Saharan Africa near 4.4 percent for 2025; the World Bank had the region nearer 4.0. Beneath it, Benin and Rwanda ran above 7 percent while much of the oil bloc barely moved. There is no single African economy. There are fifty, moving separately.

It shows up in money and silicon. After a two-year freeze, African sovereigns returned to debt markets: by year-end eight countries had raised 15.7 billion dollars across fourteen eurobond issues, with spreads at their tightest since 2019. Yet the market re-priced Africa upward, not down. Meanwhile AI’s physical layer began being built here rather than rented from abroad: Google opened a Johannesburg cloud region, Microsoft and G42 committed a billion dollars, and Cassava signed with Nvidia for the continent’s first AI factory. Whether that is ownership or subtler tenancy, I return to below. That the machines now sit on African ground is not.

If I had to keep one scene, I would keep the quieter one. A tariff is a shock: it arrives, does damage, and passes; the 15 percent Lesotho was left with will be argued over again before the decade is out. A continent learning to price its own debt and host its own compute is what stays. The first makes the headlines; the second decides where you build.

Together they describe the year: Africa took the era’s harshest imposed terms and, in the same span, wrote more of its own than it had in years. The point is not to reconcile them but to ask a sharper question, of the reader as much as the continent. Not whether the terms are fair (they are not, and were never meant to be), but this: on the decisions shaping the coming decade, whose terms is your institution accepting by default, and which could it be setting instead?

Founder, Diagelo · Johannesburg · March 2026
A seal is what makes a term binding.
The question of the year was whose it carried.
The Year in Brief

One year, two letters

Two envelopes, one year. The first came from a Washington podium: fifty percent on Lesotho, two million people, the steepest tariff put on anyone anywhere. Nobody in Maseru was asked. The second was written closer to home. Johannesburg took the G20 chair, Cassava broke ground on the continent's first AI factory, and eight governments returned to the bond market at spreads unseen since before the pandemic.

For a generation the terms came one way, drafted elsewhere and posted in. This was the year it ran both directions. One does not cancel the other. Read them apart and you misread the year.

both, same post.
The year, weighed 50%aidG20AIimposedtariffs · aid cuts · price of moneyauthoredG20 · AfCFTA · AI factoriesboth landed the same year, read them apart
Five Signals That Matter

The year, read against the grain

Five readings of 2025 and the quarter just closed. We left out the ones that only make you sound informed and kept the ones that change what you do on Monday.

the Monday five.
01

When a Mountain Kingdom Got the World's Highest Tariff

On 2 April 2025, from a podium he named Liberation Day, the American president declared a national emergency over the trade deficit and imposed reciprocal tariffs on much of the world. The rates ran off bilateral trade balances, so the smallest economies with the least to buy from America were hit hardest.

Lesotho, a landlocked kingdom of two million people, drew 50 percent, the highest rate assigned to any country. Madagascar took 47, Botswana 37, South Africa 30. Twenty African countries were placed above the 10 percent baseline. For textile towns whose entire business rested on duty-free access to American shelves, the terms of that access changed in a single afternoon.

By August the picture had shifted again. Lesotho's rate was cut to 15 percent, where most African exporters settled, while South Africa and the North African states stayed higher. An earlier Diagelo brief tracked how the tariff became the trade instrument of the year, the point at which comparative advantage stopped setting the terms of trade and access itself became something to be renegotiated.

ImplicationMarket access is now a political variable, not a given.
Why did the smallest buyers draw the steepest rates?
50Lesotho47M'gascar37Botswana15Aug ratetariff, percent
Liberation Day rates on Africa's textile exporters, and the level most settled at by August. Source: Al Jazeera, CSIS, AllAfrica, 2025.
02

The Money Came Back, and on Better Terms

For two years African sovereigns were shut out of international debt markets by borrowing costs among the world's highest. In 2025 that ended. Côte d'Ivoire opened in January, Benin and Kenya followed within weeks, and the window stayed open all year.

By December, eight countries had raised 15.7 billion dollars across fourteen eurobond issues, up 15 percent on 2024, with Morocco's two billion dollar deal heavily oversubscribed. Yields on Kenya's 2028 note fell from 10.4 to 8.3 percent over the year. The S&P Africa Sovereign Bond Index returned more than 20 percent to October, and spreads narrowed to their tightest since 2019.

The relief is genuine; so is the caveat. Most proceeds refinanced maturing debt rather than funding new capacity, and coupons still cleared 8 percent, above the nominal growth of several issuers, which is how a refinancing window quietly becomes a maturity problem. What changed in 2025 is the direction of the terms, not their generosity: for the first time since the pandemic the market moved toward these borrowers, and did so selectively, rewarding the sovereigns that had done the fiscal work.

ImplicationThe credit window is open, but it rewards the disciplined, not everyone.
After two years shut out, has the money come back?
eurobond issuance, US$bn$$$13.7bn$15.7bn20242025up 15%spreads narrowed to their tightest since 2019
African sovereign eurobond issuance. Source: AttijariCIB, Ecofin Agency, 2025.
03

There Is No African Economy. There Are Fifty.

The estimates available at the start of 2026 all told the same broad story. The IMF's January 2026 update put sub-Saharan Africa near 4.4 percent for 2025; the World Bank's January Global Economic Prospects put the region nearer 4.0 percent, up from 2024 and comfortably above a world running around 3.2 percent.

The regional figure is the least useful number in either report. The same tables show Benin above 7 percent and the East African tier firming, while Angola sat near 2 percent and parts of the oil bloc contracted. The gap between the fastest and slowest large economies now runs several times over, which is why the question is never how Africa is doing but which Africa, exposed to which shock. Two things compound it. Per capita income grew under 2 percent, short of the pace that cuts poverty quickly. And the official series miss where most people earn: nearly nine in ten sub-Saharan workers are in an informal economy the accounts were never built to see, so the chart understates the real spread.

The continental frame hides more than it reveals, at every level: country, region, sector. Anyone still allocating against a single African growth number in 2026 is pricing an average that matches almost no real place.

ImplicationOne continent, more than fifty clocks. No allocation should run on the average.
The regional number nobody actually grows at.
036912Rwanda7.2Ethiopia6.5Uganda4.5Region avg4.0oil econ.2.0real GDP growth 2025, percent
Real GDP growth, 2025 estimates, selected economies against the regional average. Source: IMF WEO January 2026 update; World Bank Global Economic Prospects, January 2026.
04

The Machines Arrived With African Addresses

For a decade the compute behind African software ran abroad. In 2025 that began to change in visible, physical ways. Google opened a cloud region in Johannesburg with a 148 million dollar commitment, and Microsoft with G42 put a billion dollars into a Kenyan cloud region and Swahili-language models.

The more consequential move came from an African operator. Cassava Technologies, built by Strive Masiyiwa, signed with Nvidia to build the continent's first AI factory, a 700 million dollar rollout starting with 3,000 GPUs in South Africa and reaching 12,000 across Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and Morocco. Unlike the state-led projects in the Gulf, this one is privately executed with an African firm holding the design.

The question the deal does not yet answer is ownership, and it answers to a checklist, not a slogan. Who holds title to the GPUs once the financing is repaid; who sets the price per compute-hour; where the weights and customer relationships sit; who books the recurring revenue. Africa still accounts for roughly 1 percent of global AI data-centre capacity, and only five of South Africa's 56 data centres are AI-capable, a base small enough that those four answers decide whether the continent builds an industry or hosts someone else's. I will track them by name.

ImplicationHosting compute is not the same as owning it.
Twelve thousand GPUs coming, but who owns them?
Nvidia GPUs deployed: first phase, then the plan3,0002025 · installedSouth Africa12,000planned · five countries×4 in one build-outthe silicon is landing; the title to it is the open question
Cassava and Nvidia GPU rollout, first phase and plan. Source: Intelligent CIO Africa, 2025.
05

A Seat at the Head of the Table

In November 2025, Johannesburg hosted the first G20 summit ever held on African soil, under a South African presidency themed on solidarity, equality and sustainability. It was the first summit since the African Union took its permanent seat.

South Africa used the chair to push debt relief, the cost of capital and inequality onto the core agenda, including a proposal for an intergovernmental panel on inequality modelled on the climate panel. The two most powerful leaders invited stayed away, and the summit adopted a leaders' declaration anyway.

Be exact about what that is worth. The declaration carries no disbursement mechanism and binds no creditor, and by mid-March it had moved no financing term for any sovereign. The honest reading is: not yet. Evidence that the chair mattered would be specific: a facility priced off the Johannesburg language, a restructuring that cites it, a 2026 budget line that would not otherwise exist. Absent that, convening power is just that. Set against the tariff letter that opened the year, though, the fact that the agenda was drafted here at all is not nothing.

ImplicationConvening power is real, and it is not yet decision power.
Which way did the year actually pull?
terms imposedtariffs · aid cuts · price of moneyterms authoredG20 · AfCFTA · AI factoriesthe same twelve months
Diagelo Foresight schematic. The two directions of 2025.

Key Takeaways

  • The terms loosened both ways. Africa took the year's harshest tariff and, in the same months, wrote more of its own agenda than it had in years.
  • A 50 percent tariff on Lesotho, cut to 15 by August, made market access a political variable rather than a given.
  • Capital returned: eight sovereigns raised $15.7bn and spreads hit a post-2019 low. But coupons cleared 8 percent and mostly rolled old debt, not new capacity.
  • The physical layer of AI got African addresses, from Google's Johannesburg region to Cassava's $700m factory. Ownership, not hosting, is the open question.
“The correct question is never how Africa is doing, but which Africa, exposed to which shock.
Signal Three · Diagelo Foresight
Graphic of the Quarter

How Does a Tariff Travel?

How one line in an executive order travelled from a Washington podium to a factory floor in Maseru, and why the firms that came through it were the ones that already had a second buyer. Read left to right.

the middle is where it hurt.a decree costs nothing to write.
Diagelo Intelligence

From decree to exit, in five moves

The band narrows as options close, then widens where a second market was waiting.

THE DECREETHE FACTORYTHE SHIPMENTTHE RETREATTHE EXITSTAGE 01The decree2 Apr 2025a Liberation Day orderimposes reciprocal tariffs;Lesotho drawn at 50%,the world's highestWHAT BINDSA single executive order,calculated from bilateraltrade balancesSTAGE 02The factory30,000 jobsexposed in Lesotho'stextile sector alone, builtentirely around duty freeaccess to US shelvesWHAT BINDSFirms with one buyerand one product line,no second doorSTAGE 03The shipment$237mof Lesotho exports to theUS in 2024, over 10% ofits GDP, now facing arewritten cost baseWHAT BINDSPorts, orders andcontracts priced on theold tariff scheduleSTAGE 04The retreat50% to 15%by August the rate is cutfor most of Africa; a 90day pause, then a settledband near 15%WHAT BINDSRelief that arrives afterorders are alreadycancelled or movedSTAGE 05The exitother doorsSouth African car exportsto the US fall 75%, yettotal exports hit a record414,268 unitsWHAT BINDSBuyers cultivated beforethe shock; optionalitybuilt in advancethe real hit
01

The damage concentrates in the middle of the chain, not at the podium. The decree cost nothing to write; it cost most to absorb for firms whose capital sat with a single buyer and no alternative.

02

The band widens again only where a second market already existed. A firm cannot buy optionality after the order lands; it must have paid for it in advance. That lesson holds well beyond textiles.

Each stage is a decision taken by someone else, until the last, which is taken here. Diagelo Intelligence. Data: Al Jazeera, AllAfrica, ISS, and our own Tariff War brief, 2025 to 2026.
Three Charts Worth Studying

Three charts that reset the base case

Chart One

Five economies, one misleading average

The January estimates put continental growth near 4 percent for 2025 on the World Bank's reading, with the IMF slightly higher for sub-Saharan Africa. The figure is real and close to useless as a planning input. Rwanda ran above 7 percent and the East African tier firmed, while oil exporters barely moved and parts of the bloc contracted. The average sits in empty space between them.

Why it matters. An allocator working from the regional number is pricing a country that does not exist. The spread between the fastest and slowest large economies runs several times over, so the question is never how Africa is doing but which Africa, exposed to which shock. The single figure understates the leaders and overstates the laggards at once, the wrong error to build a position on.

Which Africa are you actually pricing?
Real GDP growth, 2025: five clocks, five readings7.2%Rwanda6.5%Ethiopia4.5%Uganda4.0%Region avgno economy lives here2.0%Oil econ.so, which clock are you actually pricing?Source: IMF WEO January 2026 update and World Bank Global Economic Prospects, January 2026.
Chart Two

The window that reopened

After two years locked out by punishing yields, African sovereigns returned to international debt markets in 2025. Issuance rose to 15.7 billion dollars across fourteen deals by eight countries, up 15 percent, and spreads narrowed to 388 basis points, the tightest since 2019.

Why it matters. Access to the eurobond market is a verdict on credibility, and in 2025 the verdict improved. But most money rolled maturing debt forward, not new capacity, and coupons still cleared 8 percent, above the nominal growth of several issuers, the arithmetic that turns a refinancing into a maturity problem. The window is open and not cheap. Sovereigns that buy time without buying reform will meet it again, on worse terms, at the wall.

When did the bond market let Africa back in?
051015Sovereign eurobond issuance, US$ billion$13.7bn$15.7bn20242025, up 15%388 bpseurobond spread,tightest since 2019Fourteen issues by eight countries. Kenya's 2028 yield fell from 10.4 to 8.3 percent in a year.Source: AttijariCIB and Ecofin Agency, 2025.
Chart Three

Four rates in five months

Lesotho began 2025 with duty-free access to the United States under AGOA. On 2 April it was assigned 50 percent, the highest tariff in the world. Within days a 90-day pause dropped most rates to a 10 percent baseline. By August the kingdom settled at 15 percent, where most of Africa landed.

Why it matters. The final number matters less than the path to it. A factory owner cannot plan against a tariff that moves four times in five months, and orders cancelled during the 50 percent window did not return when the rate fell. The volatility did the damage, not the level. What the year exported was not a rate but the knowledge that the rate can change at will, the harder thing to price into a supply contract.

How long did fifty percent actually last?
015%30%45%Lesotho tariff into the United States, percent0%pre-202550%2 Apr10%Apr pause15%AugFive months, four different rates. The predictability never came back, even when the level did.Source: Al Jazeera and AllAfrica, 2025. Rates as assigned at each stage.
“The volatility did the damage, not the level. What the year exported was the knowledge that the rate can be changed at will.
Chart Three · Diagelo Foresight
Books, Reports and Papers

Four documents that earned their weekend

Four outside reports, each with a line on what it should change in how you hold the year, a reading list without that is just homework.

World Bank · Washington · January 2026
The take

The most current scorecard an allocator could hold at the start of the year: regional growth near 4 percent, and a spread wide enough to retire the single African number as a planning tool. Read the country tables, not the headline. The distance between the East African tier and the oil exporters is the whole story; the IMF's January update tells the same one from a higher base.

Center for Strategic and International Studies · October 2025
The take

The clearest account of how the tariff shock and the lapse of AGOA collided with an administration that also wanted trade in place of aid. For any exporter the takeaway is blunt: American market access is now a domestic political variable, and should be priced as one.

G20 South African Presidency · November 2025
The take

A 122-paragraph document is rarely worth reading in full; this one is worth reading for what it represents. The first leaders' declaration produced on African soil, with debt and the cost of capital near the centre. Convening power committed to paper. Whether it converts to disbursement is the test of 2026.

Africa Labour Research and Education Institute · 2025
The take

The most honest audit of the free trade area at five years: 35 countries piloting real trade, 2.3 million jobs linked to it, and a candid ledger of what has not moved. The gap between a signed protocol and a working customs post is where the next decade of intra-African trade is decided.

Revisiting Our Thinking

Where Were We Wrong?

Few institutions publicly audit their own published work. We intend to do it every quarter, on the record, including the parts that did not hold.

Diagelo Intelligence · published September 2025

The Tariff War Nobody Could Ignore

Revisited March 2026, against six months of outcomes.
What held

We argued that Liberation Day marked the end of comparative advantage as the operating rule of trade, and that access to the American market had become a favour to be renegotiated rather than a right. Nothing in the first quarter softened that. AGOA lapsed on 30 September 2025, was restored on 3 February 2026 on a one-year horizon, and every African exporter now budgets for a market that can close by executive order.

Where we were right

We wrote that the damage would come through volatility more than the headline rate, and that orders lost in the shock would not return when the number fell. Lesotho's rate moved from 50 to 10 to 15 percent in five months, and factories that lost contracts at 50 did not recover them at 15. Retroactive relief does not rehire a shift.

Where we were wrong, and by how much

The September brief stated plainly: "the loss of the US market will pull total South African vehicle exports down by 8 to 12 percent in 2025." It did not. Exports to the United States did collapse, from 25,554 units in 2024 to 6,530 in 2025, roughly 75 percent. But total vehicle exports rose 5.9 percent to a record 414,268 units (NAAMSA, February 2026), because Europe absorbed the difference under the existing EU and UK deals. The forecast missed by 14 to 18 points, all of it from underweighting order books already diversified before the tariff arrived. We priced the shock and missed the buffers already built.

50%
Lesotho's Liberation Day tariff, the highest assigned to any country.
15%
The rate most of Africa settled at by August 2025.
20
African countries hit above the 10 percent baseline.
1 yr
Length of the AGOA renewal that followed the lapse.

Key Takeaways

  • The thesis held on direction and mechanism: comparative advantage gave way to raw bargaining power, and volatility did more damage than the level.
  • The thesis missed adaptation. We forecast total vehicle exports would fall 8 to 12 percent; they rose 5.9 percent to a record. The miss was 14 to 18 points, all of it from underweighting pre-existing non-US order books.
  • The correction we carry forward: model the second door. Any forecast of a shock that ignores existing optionality will overstate the damage.
Questions We Are Watching

Three Questions We Are Holding

We publish the questions we cannot close. A question held honestly is worth more than a forecast held loosely.

01
Does an AI factory make an owner, or just a better tenant?
Watching: whether Cassava's GPUs anchor African-owned models and revenue, or simply host workloads priced and captured elsewhere.
02
Is AGOA worth saving, or already a relic?
Watching: whether the one-year renewal is extended, and whether African exporters keep diversifying away from a US market that now resets its own terms annually.
03
Will the open eurobond window fund building, or just refinancing?
Watching: how much of 2026 issuance funds new capacity versus rolling old debt, and whether the maturity wall arrives before the reforms do.
“Retroactive relief does not rehire a shift.
Revisiting Our Thinking · on the AGOA lapse
Looking Ahead

On the Diagelo Desk

Intelligence

The World's Largest Board Meeting

Our reading of the 2024 to 2025 election supercycle, when 1.6 billion people voted, Africa cast few of those ballots, and now lives with nearly all of their consequences.

Now live · Intelligence brief
Systems

Builders Versus Owners

Why the continent keeps producing world-class builders while other economies capture the ownership, and where the value actually compounds.

Now live · Systems brief
The Year, in One Picture

Weather, and climate

One line is the tariff: it spiked in April, did real damage, and drifted back toward the baseline. The other is the continent pricing its own debt and hosting its own compute, climbing quietly all year. Run the pointer across 2025 to read them together.

JanAprJulOctDecFeb two lines this year.only one of them stays. eurobonds reopenAI factories landG20 chairLesotho +50%left at 15% Weather · terms imposed on AfricaClimate · terms Africa authored Apr '25 weather leaves. climate stays.
The imposed terms of the year were louder; the authored ones will still be here when the noise has passed. Diagelo Intelligence
From the desk

One last thing, before you close this.

I have read this chart more times than I should admit, and it is never the spike that stays with me. It is the quiet green line underneath: a continent, in a single year, learning to price its own debt and keep its own machines. The loud terms will keep arriving from rooms no one here was invited to. The quiet ones carry local names on the deed. If you carry one habit into the year: watch the line that climbs while no one is shouting.

The EditorJohannesburg

Terms are not fixed.

For a long time they were treated as if they were: handed down from elsewhere, to be survived rather than shaped. In 2025 that stopped holding cleanly. A tariff did arrive from a podium no African voter could reach. But a G20 was chaired here, a free trade area kept building, and the first AI factories broke ground under African ownership.

The lesson is not that Africa now sets its own terms; on most of what matters, it plainly does not. It is narrower. More of those terms are contested than a year ago, more are drafted on the continent than before, and institutions that treat every rule as fixed will keep being surprised by the ones that move. Which of the four decade-trajectories mapped last January Africa ends up on will be settled less by any single forecast than by who keeps drafting the terms, year after year, in rooms like the one in Johannesburg.

The task is not to predict which terms will change. It is to know, at every moment, which ones your institution is accepting by default, and which ones it could be writing itself.

Write to us

The Diagelo Quarterly is published as a public good. Disagreement, correction and better data are all welcome, and the revisiting section exists to carry them.

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